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Abstract. A continuous time model for multiagent systems governed by reinforcement learning with scale-
free memory is developed. The agents are assumed to act independently of one another in optimizing their
choice of possible actions via trial-and-error search. To gain awareness about the action value the agents
accumulate in their memory the rewards obtained from taking a specific action at each moment of time.
The contribution of the rewards in the past to the agent current perception of action value is described
by an integral operator with a power-law kernel. Finally a fractional differential equation governing the
system dynamics is obtained. The agents are considered to interact with one another implicitly via the
reward of one agent depending on the choice of the other agents. The pairwise interaction model is adopted
to describe this effect. As a specific example of systems with non-transitive interactions, a two agent and
three agent systems of the rock-paper-scissors type are analyzed in detail, including the stability analysis
and numerical simulation. Scale-free memory is demonstrated to cause complex dynamics of the systems
at hand. In particular, it is shown that there can be simultaneously two modes of the system instability
undergoing subcritical and supercritical bifurcation, with the latter one exhibiting anomalous oscillations
with the amplitude and period growing with time. Besides, the instability onset via this supercritical mode
may be regarded as “altruism self-organization”. For the three agent system the instability dynamics is
found to be rather irregular and can be composed of alternate fragments of oscillations different in their
properties.
PACS. 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems – 89.75.Da Systems obeying scaling laws – 02.50.Le Decision
theory and game theory – 05.65.+b Self-organized systems
1 Introduction
During the last decades application of physical notions
and the mathematical formalism of statistical physics to
describing economic and social systems attracted much at-
tention in the scientific community (see, e.g., [1]). The effi-
ciency of this approach has been demonstrated, in partic-
ular, in modeling cooperative motion of vehicles in traffic
flow, pedestrian ensembles, and groups of animals with so-
cial behavior [2], dynamics of stock markets [3,4], opinion
formation, culture and language evolution [5]. The multi-
agent reinforcement learning problem is one of the promis-
ing techniques of modeling the evolution and adaptation of
complex systems in which human factor plays an essential
role. Until now, this problem was studied mainly within
the scope of artificial intelligence (for a review see [6]).
Nevertheless, recently the concepts of statistical physics
were combined with the notions of reinforcement learning
to simulate the dynamics of minority games [7,8,9,10] and
a e-mail: ialub@fpl.gpi.ru
b e-mail: kanemoto@u-aizu.ac.jp
evolutionary games [11], adaptive competition in a market
[12], as well as to establish the relationship between the
reinforcement learning and the replicator model of popu-
lation biology [13,14]. The latter, in particular, made it
possible to analyze the complex behavior, including the
onset of dynamical chaos for agent ensembles using the
techniques of dynamical systems [15,16,17].
It should be noted that the majority of models similar
to ones listed above and constructed to capture character-
istic features of the social system dynamics invoke notions
and concepts inherited directly from statistical physics.
However, generally speaking, agent models imitating the
behavior of human beings should possess also their own
features that are inapplicable to physical objects or, at
least, anomalous from the standpoints of physics [18,19].
One of such anomalous features is the impact of system
history implemented, in particular, via the effects of hu-
man memory in learning process as well as the evaluation
of previous events in the decision making at the current
moment of time. Comparing social systems and objects of
classical physics we note that the latter ones have no mem-
ory in the following sense. If the positions and the veloci-
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ties of all the particles forming a closed system are known
at some moment of time chosen arbitrary, then its fur-
ther dynamics is completely predictable at least formally.
Randomness arises at the level of reduced description and
even in this case the dominating approximation is Marko-
vian random processes again without memory; given the
state of a system at some moment of time, its probabilistic
dynamics is completely determined. Broadly speaking, in
the present paper we intend to focus on possible history
effects in social systems whose dynamics can be imitated
by multiagent reinforcement learning as well as to discuss
mathematical notions relevant to their description.
General arguments about human perception and event
evaluation convince us to make use of a scale-free-memory
model to describe the impact of system history on the re-
inforcement learning. In this model the impact of events
happened in the past (at time t′) is weighted at the current
moment of time t with some function K(t − t′) showing
a power-law decrease with the time difference t − t′. In
fact, let us consider two events influencing our decision
in a similar manner, which enables us to compare them
with each other in assessing the current situation. If one
of the two events happened one day before the current date
whereas the other happened one week ago, then we will
regard them as substantially different in time with respect
to their contribution to our perception of the present sit-
uation. By contrast, if the first event occurred one month
and one day ago and the second event occurred one month
and one week ago, we will draw no real distinction be-
tween each other by the time of their occurrence. In other
words, if the time lag between the two events is compara-
ble with the time scale separating them from the present
moment, then their impacts will be regarded as different
in magnitude. On the contrary, if their time lag is much
less then the passed time these events can be considered
to be simultaneous. Exactly such a behavior is common
to a power-law dependence K(t − t′) ∝ (t − t′)−z with a
certain exponent z > 0.
This model is partly justified by the observed long-
term memory effects in the scale-free foraging by primates
[20,21,22] or insects [23,24] and the conclusion about the
explicit relationship between scale-free foraging and the
memory properties [25]. The human memory retrieval is
also characterized by a scale-free pattern [26] in addition
to the fact that it is composed of many distinct systems
(for a review see [27]). Besides, stock markets, where hu-
man factor is doubtless of great concern, exhibit similar
effects, in particular, time correlations in the volatility of
returns are characterized by a power-law decay (see, e.g,
[28,29]).
The specific purpose of the present paper is to analyze
how the scale-free memory can be introduced into the mul-
tiagent reinforcement learning as well as to consider its
characteristic effects in dynamics of multiagent systems
with agent interaction similar to the rock-paper-scissors
game. In such a system agents share a common environ-
ment, so each time, when one of them takes some action,
it disturbs the environment, causing the response of the
other agents. The learning process enables the agents with
long-term memory to follow the variations of the envi-
ronment in optimizing their own actions. The rock-paper-
scissors model determining the agent interaction was cho-
sen for two reasons.
First, this model is one of the simplest examples of
non-transitive interactions: a rock beats a pair of scissors,
scissors beat a sheet of paper, and paper beats a rock. So
ordering the three objects according to their dominance
we get a competitive cycle, which can be responsible for
a variety of self-organization phenomena in social and bi-
ological systems (see, e.g., [30] and references therein).
Second, the rock-paper-scissors dynamics is found to
be rather common for polymorphic populations, in partic-
ular, Jamaican cryptic coral reef communities [31], yeast
populations [32] and population of marine isopods [33,
34], microbial laboratory communities [35,36], polymor-
phic groups of side-blotched lizards [37,38], lek-breeding
ruffs [39,40], and Gouldian finches [41]. This fact merits a
more detailed discussion.
Rock-paper-scissors game and speciation
The trimorphism of such populations, wherein the species
interaction is referred to as a biological rock-paper-scissors
game [42], is caused by basic properties of the frequency
dependent selection being crucial in maintaining the bio-
diversity (for a review see [43]). The frequency dependent
selection (FGS), i.e., the rate of offspring generation de-
pending on the relative volume of a given phenotype, is
implemented in such communities via various mechanisms.
These mechanisms are classified into two groups, the pos-
itive and negative FDS, according to whether they cause
this dependence to be increasing or decreasing, respec-
tively. When mixtures of positive and negative FDS inter-
act, a system can become destabilized and oscillate [43].
Keeping in mind the further constructions, we note
that learning and innate behavior are ones of the main
mechanisms responsible for the positive FDS, with both
of them affecting each other [43]. For example, the ob-
served rapid evolution of dispersal, i.e., movement of indi-
viduals from their natal or previous breeding sites to new
ones [44], requires the presence of heritable genetic vari-
ations for traits affecting dispersal behavior and strong
selection acting on these traits (see, e.g., a review [45]). In
particular, in vertebrates, where dispersal is often con-
sidered to be a plastic, condition-dependent trait with
low heritability, a significant heritability in the disper-
sal propensity, i.e. the probability of dispersal between
habitat patches has been directly found for collared fly-
catchers [46]. Learning to be efficient requires enhanced
long-term memory, especially it concerns those species of
birds and mammals that cache food for later use or birds
that carry out regular seasonal migrations returning to the
same breeding and wintering grounds, or even stopover
sites. For example, Clark’s nutcrackers possess memory
for cache sites spanning more than 7–9 months [47] and
for long-distance migratory garden warblers their mem-
ory of particular feeding sites persists during at least 12
months [48]. It is worthwhile to note also investigations of
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the relationship between spatial use strategies and medial
and dorsal cortical volumes in males of the side-blotched
lizard as a criterion of the species memory capacity [49].
Males in this species occur in three morphs using differ-
ent spatial niches: large territory holders, small territory
holders and nonterritory holders with home ranges of the
smallest size. According to the found results, the larger
the used territory, the larger the medial and dorsal corti-
cal volumes.
The analysis of the geographic variations and evolu-
tionary history of the side-blotched lizard with the rock-
paper-scissors mating strategies [50] has thrown light on
basic mechanisms governing speciation. Polymorphic forms
within a population can be the starting material for new
species [51,52,53,54] and, in this case, the rock-paper-
scissors FDS causing self-sustaining cycle variations main-
tains the required polymorphism [50]. On one hand, the
found pattern has turned out to contain also monomor-
phic and dimorphic populations that resemble the morphs
in trimorphic populations. This resemblance suggests that
rock-paper-scissors cycles of morphs were destabilized, giv-
ing rise to the irreversible loss and fixation of certain
morphs and, thus, the rapid phenotype evolution. On the
other hand, the phylogenetic analysis revealed that this
trimorphism was maintained for millions of years, even
across speciation events. Thereby, the rock-paper-scissors
interaction of species in trimorphic populations seems to
cause evolutionary stable cyclic variations in morphs that
undergo repeated breakdown events [50]. In addition, an-
alyzing a clade of dung beetles [55] it has been demon-
strated that insects assumed to be dimorphic can form
trimorphic populations with cyclic phenotype variations
via two threshold mechanism.
The model to be developed will demonstrate that long-
term scale-free memory in the multiagent reinforcement
learning governed by the rock-paper-scissors interaction
can be responsible for complex dynamics. In particular,
relatively regular oscillations can be alternated by oscilla-
tions with a large amplitude and period growing in time
and the system admits the instability onset via subcritical
as well as supercritical bifurcation for different modes of
perturbations.
2 Agent memory and reinforcement learning
2.1 Continuous time description of multi-agent
dynamics
Let us consider of a collection of N agents A = {ai}
(i = 1, 2, . . . , N) that individually can take one of the
actions from a set X = {x} of M -elements and act inde-
pendently of one another. The preference of an action x
for a given agent a is determined by the agent perception
of its value Qa(x, t) gained by the current moment of time
t in exploring all the actions X previously.
Within the discrete-time approximation the agents are
assumed to take new actions at the time moments tn =
n∆, where n = 0, 1, 2, . . . and ∆ is the time step. The
probability of choosing an action x by a given agent a at
time t is
Pa(x, t) = e
βQa(x,t)
[∑
x′∈X
eβQa(x
′,t)
]−1
, (1)
where the quantity 1/β characterizes the perception thresh-
old of the agents in evaluating their actions. If at the initial
time t0 = 0 (i.e. for n = 0) the agents have no information
about the action value, then the condition
Qa(x, t)|t=t0 = 0 (2a)
will hold for every agent a and action x. Otherwise, the
initial condition
Qa(x, t)|t=t0 = Q∗a(x) (2b)
describes the agent preliminary opinion about the action
value. In numerical simulations to be described below con-
dition (2b) was used with the quantities Q∗a(x, t) set equal
to some random numbers to disturb the system equilib-
rium and induce transient processes.
The system dynamics is governed by the learning of
agents aimed at finding the most appropriate action via
the trial-and-error search. Following [15,16,17] we make
use of a simple integrator algorithm of the reinforcement
learning (see, e.g., [56,57]). First, it assumes the agents
to accumulate local rewards received at one step to raise
awareness about the value of the possible actions. Sec-
ond, because of bounded capacity of the agent memory
events in the past separated from the present by time
scales exceeding a certain value T practically do not con-
tribute to the awareness gained by the agents at the cur-
rent time t. Third, according to expression (1) each agent
explores more often actions in the vicinity of the action
being optimal from its current point of view. So to recon-
struct the value of the possible actions properly it should
weight local rewards differently depending on the prox-
imity of a given action to the optimal one. This reason-
ing is also supported by the fact that people overweight
low-probability events and underweight high-probability
events in the description-based decision-making which sum-
maries descriptions detailing all possible outcomes and
their respective likelihoods of each option (for a review
see, e.g., [58,59]). To allow for this feature we introduce
the coefficient
Wa(x, t) =W
[
Pa(x, t)
]
(3)
weighting the reward gained by the given agent a from
taking the action x at time t depending on its current
perception of the action value. Following the spirit of the
prospect theory [60] and the update rule of frequency max-
imum Q-value heuristics [6] the weight coefficient (3) is
assumed to be a non-increasing function on the current
probability Pa(x, t) of the agent a taking the action x.
The ansatz W (P ) = 1 is widely met in literature.
However, when the W (P )-dependence is rather weak and
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the agent memory is long enough the reinforcement learn-
ing mechanism under consideration can give rise to the
Nash equilibrium instability not due to the agent inter-
action (Appendix A). It is just caused by a higher rate
of the reward accumulation for actions with higher prob-
ability. In the present paper we focus on the multiagent
reinforcement learning whose complex dynamics is caused
by the mutual interaction of agents possessing, in partic-
ular, long-term memory. So, from this standpoint such an
instability may be treated as a “malfunction” of the ana-
lyzed algorithm and its possible influence on the studied
phenomena should be eliminated. Keeping in mind results
obtained in Appendix A we adopt the ansatz
Wa(x, t) =
1
Pa(x, t)
(4)
which matches the simplest model being free from insta-
bilities of the Nash equilibrium not caused by the agent
interaction and describes the accumulation of knowledge
about the action value proceeding uniformly, on the aver-
age, for all the possible actions.
Taking into account the aforementioned features the
following version of the difference-learning equation
Qa(x, tn+1) =
δxxa∆
Pa(x, tn)
Ra(x|Xa)
− ∆
T
Qa(x, tn) +Qa(x, tn) (5)
is applied to update the agent awareness at the time mo-
ments {tn}. The first term in expression (5) on the right-
hand side describes the accumulation of the knowledge
about the action xa taken by the agent a at time tn. Here
δxxa is the Kronecker delta, the payoff function Ra(x|Xa)
describes the reward normalized to unit time that the
agent a = ai gains from the action x provided all the
other agents
Aa = {a1, a2, . . . , ai−1,⊔, ai+1, . . . , aN}
have taken the actions
Xa = {x1, x2, . . . , xi−1,⊔, xi+1, . . . , xN} ,
and the cofactor 1/Pa(x, t) weights the contribution of the
action x. The second term is caused by the agent memory
loss and in what follows the inequality
∆≪ T (6)
will be assumed to hold beforehand.
By virtue of inequality (6) for the function Qa(x, t) to
reach some saturation a large number of the system up-
dates need to be executed. In other words, every agent
gains awareness of the action value through many trials
and, thus, explores, explicitly or implicitly, many options
of the agent actions. It enables us, first, to average equa-
tion (5) over all the possible points of the configuration
space {X} = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} , xi ∈ X
assuming the probability of a particular configuration X
occurring at time t to be determined by the expression
P(X , t) =
N∏
i=1
Pi(xi, t) (7)
and, second, to treat the action value Qa(x, t) as a contin-
uous function of the time t. Decomposition (7) is due to
the adopted assumption about the mutual independence
of the agents in taking actions. In this way (Appendix A)
the update rule (5) is reduced to the following differential
equation
dqa(x, t)
dt
= ra(x, t)− 1
T
qa(x, t) , (8)
where
qa(x, t) = Qa(x, t) − 1
M
∑
x′∈X
Qa(x
′, t) (9)
and
ra(x, t) =
∑
Xa
Ra(x|Xa)
∏
a′∈Aa
Pa′(xa′ , t)
− 1
M
∑
x′∈X
∑
Xa
Ra(x
′|Xa)
∏
a′∈Aa
Pa′(xa′ , t) (10)
is the reward rate gained by the agent a from taking the
action x and measured relative to its value averaged over
all the possible actions X.
In what follows we will confine our consideration to the
dynamics of the quantities qa(x, t) instead of Qa(x, t) for
two reasons. One of them is the fact that the probabilities
Pa(x, t) of the agent choice can equally be treated as direct
functions of qa(x, t). Indeed, substituting (9) into (1) we
get
Pa(x, t) = e
βqa(x,t)
[∑
x′∈X
eβqa(x
′,t)
]−1
. (11)
The other is the possibility to eliminate a strong homoge-
neous growth of the action value from consideration which
does not affect the system dynamics at all and, so, has
no definite physical interpretation. The quantities qa(x, t)
meet the equality ∑
x∈X
qa(x, t) = 0 . (12)
for any agent a at each moment of time t as follows form
definition (9).
It should be noted that expression (10) actually spec-
ifies some autonomous operator ra
{
q1, q2, . . . , qN
}
map-
ping the quantities {qi} onto the reward rate
ra(x, t) = ra
{
q1(x, t), q2(x, t), . . . , qN (x, t)
}
, (13)
which holds also for a rather arbitrary form of the W (P )-
dependence (Appendix A). So, in fact, expression (8) is
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an autonomous nonlinear equation. It forms the complete
continuous-time description of the multiagent system at
hand provided the payoff function Ra(x|Xa) is known and
the agent memory is characterized by the time scale T .
To clarify the latter statement let us consider the integral
representation of equation (8).
2.2 Memory models and the notion of initial conditions
Using the method of variation of parameters the differ-
ential equation (8) is reduced to the following Volterra
integral equation
qa(x, t) =
t∫
t0
dt′ e−
(t−t′)
T ra(x, t
′)+e−
(t−t0)
T qa(x, t0) , (14)
where the function ra(x, t) is given by expression (13).
The Volterra equation (14) can be interpreted as the ex-
plicit formulation of the agent memory model character-
ized by the time scale T . The former term on the right-
hand side of (14) specifies the accumulation of the agent
knowledge about the action value during the time interval
(t0, t), whereas the latter one determines the evolution of
the knowledge gained in the past. In fact, dealing with the
whole history of the system we replace expression (14) by
the corresponding integral over the semiaxis (−∞, t)
qa(x, t) =
t∫
−∞
dt′ e−
(t−t′)
T ra(x, t
′) . (15)
Then using to the property of the exponential function
e−
(t−t′)
T = e−
(t−t0)
T · e−
(t0−t
′)
T (16)
we introduce the notion of initial conditions just setting
qa(x, t0) =
t0∫
−∞
dt′ e−
(t0−t
′)
T ra(x, t
′) , (17)
converting (15) back to (14). In the frameworks of this
model all similar events within time span about T con-
tribute to the agent perception equivalently and the func-
tion K(t − t′) = exp{−(t − t′)/T } is the kernel of the
integral operator (14) weighting the current contributions
of the events happened in the past.
If the agent memory is described by another kernel
K(t− t′) not equal to the exponential function, i.e.
qa(x, t) =
t∫
−∞
dt′K(t− t′) ra(x, t′) , (18)
then the property corresponding to equality (16) does not
hold and the notion of initial conditions becomes inappli-
cable in the general case.
However appealing, for example, to ecological systems
discussed in Introduction we see that the notion of ini-
tial conditions can have its own meaning independent of
specific memory models. Habits of offspring being of mul-
tifactorial nature originate, in particular, from a mixture
of parental and environmental contributions. The parental
effects include a non-genetic parent-offspring transmission
of preferable strategies of behavior reflecting the aware-
ness gained previously by parents. The environmental fac-
tor is responsible for accumulating information of personal
experience and its influence grows with increasing age. A
discussion of these phenomena in connection with the bio-
diversity formation can be found, e.g., in reviews [61,62,
63]. Therefore in mathematical description of the cumu-
lative effect of natal awareness and personal experience
on species adaptation the time of birth is the appropriate
point for introducing the relevant initial conditions.
In the present paper we will construct initial condi-
tions for the analyzed process of reinforcement learning
presuming that there is a certain specific time moment
t0 when this process is initiated. Keeping in mind the
parent-offspring communication let us adopt the follow-
ing three assumptions about the learning process of agents
with scale-free memory.
First, within a sufficiently long time interval T the
agents remember the times {t′} at which events happened
and their contribution at the current moment of time t is
weighted by the kernel K(t − t′) ∝ 1/(t − t′)(1−γ) with
the exponent 0 < γ < 1. The latter inequality is due the
fact that, on one hand, the agent preference should be a
really cumulative effect of all the previous rewards, i.e. the
integral
C− :=
∫ t
t−T
dt′K(t− t′) ∝
∫ t
t−T
dt′
(t− t′)1−γ ∼
1
γ
T γ (19)
has to diverge as formally T → ∞. On the other hand,
the kernel K(t − t′) must be a decreasing function. The
estimate C− of integral (19) can be regarded as a cer-
tain capacity of agent memory relating the action value
qa(x) ∼ r¯a(x)C− to the mean rewards r¯a(x) gained by
the agent a during this time.
Second, on temporal scales larger than T the agents do
not rank the events according to their occurrence times,
they just fix these events in the memory. It is described
by the replacement
t−T∫
−∞
dt′K(t− t′) ra(x, t′)⇒ r¯a(x)
t−T∫
−∞
dt′K(t− t′) . (20)
So on such scales the integral
C+ ∼
∫ t−T
−∞
dt′K(t− t′) (21)
is to converge at the lower limit. In addition, its contribu-
tion to the memory capacity should be of the same order,
i.e. the estimate C+ ∼ C− must hold. The latter is the case
if the kernel K(t − t′) ∝ T 2γ/(t− t′)1+γ for (t− t′) & T .
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Here the factor T 2γ is due to the continuity of the function
K(t− t′) at t− t′ = T .
Summarizing the two assumptions we state that the
kernel K(t − t′) of the scale-free memory model should
exhibit the following asymptotic behavior
K(t− t′) ∼ τ
1−γ
(t− t′)1−γ for t− t
′ . T , (22a)
and
K(t− t′) ∼ τ
1−γ T 2γ
(t− t′)1+γ for t− t
′ & T . (22b)
Here a certain “microscopic” time scale τ has been intro-
duced because the kernelK(t−t′) must be a dimensionless
quantity in the present constructions. Let us make use of
the so-called γ-exponential function [64] or, what is the
same, Rabotnov’s function [65]
K(t− t′) = τ
1−γ
(t− t′)1−γEγ,γ
[
−
(
t− t′
T
)γ]
(23)
to construct the crossover between the given asymptotics.
Here
Eγ,γ(z) =
∞∑
k=0
zk
Γ [(k + 1)γ]
, (24)
is the Mittag-Leffler functions in two parameters and Γ (z)
is the gamma function. In the limit γ → 1, when all the
events within the time scale T contribute equivalently to
the agent perception at the current time, kernel (23) takes
the exponential form, K(t − t′) → exp[−(t − t′)/T ]. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the behavior of kernel (23).
Third, at the initial time t0 the agents have no personal
knowledge about the value of the actions X and can rely
only on awareness gained previously in some way. It is a
certain analogy to the situation described within the sec-
ond assumption; only the fact that some event happened
is essential, whereas its occurrence time is not known.
So to quantify such pre-awareness we can deal with only
some quantities qa(x, t0) aggregating this information as
a whole. To make it possible to measure the contributions
from the pre-awareness and the personal experience in the
same units let us introduce an effective reward rate r¯a(x)
related to the quantity qa(x, t0) by the expression
qa(x, t0) = r¯a(x)
t0∫
−∞
dt′K(t0 − t′) . (25)
Then as time goes on the contribution of the pre-awareness
evolves as
r¯a(x)
t0∫
−∞
dt′K(t− t′) = Kb(t− t0) qa(x, t0) , (26)
Fig. 1. A plot illustrating the excepted approximation (23) of
the kernel K(t− t′) vs the time difference (t− t′) (upper panel)
and the crossover between asymptotics (22) (lower panel).
where the function
Kb(t− t0) =
[
t0∫
−∞
dt′K(t− t′)
]
[
t0∫
−∞
dt′K(t0 − t′)
] . (27)
Using the Mittag-Leffler function in one parameter Eγ(z)
defined via the series [64]
Eγ(z) =
∞∑
k=0
zk
Γ (γk + 1)
(28)
we can show directly that
d
dt
Eγ
[
−
(
t
T
)γ]
= − 1
t1−γT γ
Eγ,γ
[
−
(
t
T
)γ]
,
thus,
K(t− t′) = (τ1−γT γ) d
dt′
Eγ
[
−
(
t− t′
T
)γ]
.
Therefore formula (27) can be rewritten as
Kb(t− t0) = Eγ
[
−
(
t− t0
T
)γ]
(29)
provided the kernel K(t− t′) is given by expression (23).
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Combing together the three assumptions we write the
desired integral Volterra equation governing the multia-
gent reinforcement learning with scale-free memory in the
following form
qa(x, t) = τ
1−γ
t∫
t0
dt′
Eγ,γ
[
−
(
t−t′
T
)γ]
(t− t′)1−γ ra(x, t
′)
+ Eγ
[
−
(
t− t0
T
)γ]
qa(x, t0) . (30)
As before, the former term in this equation specifies the
accumulation of the agent knowledge about the action
value gained via reinforcement learning, whereas the lat-
ter one describes the evolution of the contribution from
the pre-awareness. It should be noted that relative math-
ematical constructions were discussed within the so-called
temporal-difference algorithm of the reinforcement learn-
ing [57].
Concluding the given section we underline once more
that the introduced notion of initial conditions implies the
existence of a certain special point in the agent “life”; it
is the moment when the agents start their activity for the
first time and, thus, have no direct experience in taking
these specific actions. In contrast, the memory model with
a fixed time scale enables one to impose initial conditions
on the system dynamics at any moment of time.
2.3 Governing equation
The obtained integral equation (30) can be converted into
a differential equation with fractional time derivative us-
ing fractional calculus. Namely, the known relationship
between the Cauchy type problems for fractional differ-
ential equations and the Volterra integral equations [64]
enables us to reduce (30) to the following equation
CD̂γt0qa(x, t) = τ
1−γra(x, t)− 1
T 1−γ
qa(x, t) , (31)
where the left-hand side is the Caputo fractional derivative
of order γ defined by the expression
CD̂γt0qa(x, t) :=
1
Γ (1− γ)
t∫
t0
dt′
(t− t′)γ
dqa(x, t
′)
dt′
. (32)
Equation (31) should be subjected to the initial condi-
tion (2) or, more strictly, to the condition
qa(x, t0) = q
∗
a(x) (33)
with the quantities q∗a(x) = Q
∗
a(x) − 〈Q∗a(x)〉x given be-
forehand. Expression (31) is the desired governing equa-
tion of the mean field theory for the analyzed multiagent
reinforcement learning with scale-free memory.
We also point out that for the scale-free memory the
description of the multiagent reinforcement learning is no
longer reduced to the replicator equations of population
biology. For this reduction to hold the governing equation
of the reinforcement learning has to be of the first order
in the time derivative.
2.4 Pairwise agent interaction
To complete the construction of the model at hand we
need to specify the interaction of the agents which is de-
termined by the payoff function Ra(x|Xa). Let us confine
our consideration to the pairwise approximation of the
agent interaction [66]. In particular, biodiversity effects
can be largely described in terms of pairwise interactions
among species [67,68], however, multi-species interactions
seem to be necessary in describing complex hierarchical
communities [69,70]. In the model of pairwise agent inter-
action the payoff function Ra(x|Xa) is written as (cf., e.g.,
[71])
Ra(x|Xa) = ρxa +
∑
a′∈Aa
ρxx
′
aa′ . (34)
Keeping in mind formula (10) determining the reward rate
ra(x, t) as well as the identity∑
x∈X
Pa(x, t) = 1
it is worthwhile to rewrite expression (34) in such a way
that eliminates the terms not contributing to ra(x, t) and
combines similar terms with one another. Namely, let us
make use of the following replacements
ρxa := ρ
x
a −
〈
ρya
〉
y
+
∑
a′ 6=a
[〈
ρxy
′
aa′
〉
y′
−
〈
ρyy
′
aa′
〉
yy′
]
and
ρxx
′
aa′ := ρ
xx′
aa′ −
〈
ρxy
′
aa′
〉
y′
−
〈
ρyx
′
aa′
〉
y
+
〈
ρyy
′
aa′
〉
yy′
,
where the notations〈
. . .
〉
y
=
1
M
∑
y∈X
(. . .) and
〈
. . .
〉
yy′
=
1
M2
∑
y,y′∈X
(. . .)
have been introduced. In this case expression (10) becomes
ra(x, t) = ρ
x
a +
∑
a′∈Aa
∑
x′∈X
ρxx
′
aa′Pa′(x
′, t) (35)
and without loss of generality in what follows we will pre-
sume the equalities〈
ρya
〉
y
= 0 ,
〈
ρyx
′
aa′
〉
y
= 0 ,
〈
ρxy
′
aa′
〉
y′
= 0 (36)
to hold beforehand.
3 Rock-Paper-Scissors model
In the present section we consider a simple system of the
rock-paper-scissors type and demonstrate that the scale-
free memory can give rise to a complex dynamics caused
by instability modes with different time scales. The spe-
cific model to be constructed mimics, in particular, some
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Fig. 2. Diagram illustrating the agent interaction of the rock-
paper-scissors type.
characteristic features of mating behavior in trimorphic
populations of the side-blotched lizard (see [72] and ref-
erences therein); a general review on the role of sexual
selection in maintaining biodiversity can be found in [73].
In these populations female preferences impact on the fre-
quency dependent selection and, what is essential, change
with the female age. Females of the side-blotched lizard
exist in two distinct morphs, however, in describing the
female choice based on multiple male traits three types
of females can be singled out [74]. Males express three
morphs that exhibit alternative strategies in intrasexual
competition referred to as the rock-paper-scissors biolog-
ical game (see Introduction). Recently, the mate choice
governed by learning and accumulation of individual ex-
perience has attracted theoretical attention, in particular,
when of the optimal choice is disturbed in a varying en-
vironment [75] or as a self-organization phenomenon in
mutual male-female learning [76]; a review of the preced-
ing models and used notions is also presented in the cited
papers. In this context the model under consideration can
be regarded as an example illustrating the dynamics of fe-
male mate choice affected by the female intrasexual com-
petition.
3.1 Model
Let us focus on two systems comprising two agents {a1, a2}
or three agents {a1, a2, a3}, and the set of their possible
actions consisting of three elements {x1, x2, x3}. All these
actions on their own are considered to be equivalent for ev-
ery agent, therefore, we set ρxa = 0 for all a and x. The im-
plicit pairwise interaction of the agents with one another
is determined by two factors. One of them is the struc-
ture of rewards gained by a pair of agents taking different
actions. These rewards are assumed to be determined by
the rock-paper-scissors payoff matrix 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0
 ,
which is illustrated in Fig. 2. According to this payoff ma-
trix if, for example, the agent a1 takes the action x1 and
the agent a2 takes the action x2, then the first agent re-
ceives the benefit g12, whereas the second one loses this
value. The other factor is the reward redistribution when,
for example, the agents a1 and a2 take the same action xi.
To specify the latter factor we ascribe to each agent a its
individual “power” 0 < ηa < 1 and assign, for example,
to the agents a1 and a2 the rewards
ǫ12 = g12ω12
η1
η1 + η2
, ǫ21 = g21ω21
η2
η1 + η2
, (37)
respectively, with the interaction constants gii′ and ωii′ >
0 being symmetrical with respect to permutation of in-
dices.
Summarizing these assumptions and following the ac-
cepted renormalization of the payoff function Ra(x|Xa)
(Sec. 2.4) we write the interaction matrix ρxx
′
aa′ in the form
ρ̂aa′ = gaa′
 23ǫaa′ 1− 13ǫaa′ −1− 13 ǫaa′−1− 13ǫaa′ 23ǫaa′ 1− 13ǫaa′
1− 13ǫaa′ −1− 13ǫaa′ 23ǫaa′
 . (38)
In addition the time scale T characterizing the ability of
the agent memory and introduced in Sec. 2.2 is set equal to
infinity in order to study the effects of scale-free-memory
on their own.
Under such conditions the governing equation (31) be-
comes
τγ−1CD̂γt0qa(x, t) =
∑
a′∈Aa
∑
x′ ρ
xx′
aa′ e
βqa′ (x
′,t)∑
x′′ e
βqa′(x
′′,t)
. (39)
This equation possesses the stationary solution
qeqa (x) = 0 (40)
for every agent a and action x, which matches the Nash
equilibrium attained when all the actions are equivalent
in value and, thus, P eqa (x) = 1/3.
In what follows equation (39) will be analyzed with re-
spect to the stability of the system dynamics and develop-
ment of a possible instability will be studied numerically.
In addition, to single out the affects that are due to the
scale-free memory solely the further analysis will be con-
fined to the case of identical agents setting gaa′ = g and
ǫaa′ = ǫa′a = ǫ for any pair of agents a and a
′.
3.2 Linear stability analysis
In the given multiagent system there are two sources of
equilibrium perturbations. One of them is the deviation of
the initial values q∗a(x) from q
eq
a (x), the other is random
variations in the reward rates reflecting the probabilistic
nature of the agent choice. Since the initial conditions can
be imposed on this system only at a certain specific mo-
ment of time the two types of perturbations need to be
considered separately.
The present paper concerns the deterministic descrip-
tion of the agent choice dynamics and the equilibrium per-
turbations are introduced via the initial condition (33). So
in this section we explicitly analyze the system stability
with respect to the first type perturbations, the second
type perturbations are considered in Appendix B.
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The eigenfunctions of the Caputo fractional derivative
operator (32) meeting the Cauchy initial condition of type
(33) can be written in terms of the Mittag-Leffler function
in one parameter, namely, Eγ [λ(t− t0)γ ], where λ is the
corresponding eigenvalue being a complex number in the
general case. This follows from the identity [64]
CD̂γt0Eγ [λ(t− t0)γ ] = λEγ [λ(t− t0)γ ] . (41)
The known asymptotic behavior of the Mittag-Leffler func-
tion Eγ(z) of order 0 < γ < 1 [64] enables us to represent
the asymptotics of these eigenfunctions for t→∞ as
Eγ (λt
γ) =
1
γ
e(λ
1/γ t) +O
(
1
tγ
)
(42a)
when the argument of the eigenvalue λ lies in the interval
|arg(λ)| ≤ γπ/2 and
Eγ (λt
γ) = − 1
λΓ (1− γ) · tγ +O
(
1
t2γ
)
(42b)
for γπ/2 < |arg(λ)| ≤ π. According to expressions (42)
the instability occurs when the governing equation (39)
admits the eigenvalues meeting the inequality |arg(λ)| ≤
γπ/2. In this case, by virtue of (42a), the perturbation
growth is exponential. The asymptotics (42b) matching
the stable system dynamics describes the power-law decay
of perturbations.
Therefore linearizing equation (39) near the stationary
point (40) we seek its solution in the form
qa(x, t) = θ
x
aEγ [λ(t− t0)γ ] , (43)
where {θxa} are some constants. In this way the eigenvalue
problem for equation (39) is reduced to finding the eigen-
values h of the matrices
F̂2 =
[
0 ρ̂
ρ̂ 0
]
, F̂3 =
0 ρ̂ ρ̂ρ̂ 0 ρ̂
ρ̂ ρ̂ 0
 (44)
for the systems with two and three agents, respectively,
where the notation
ρ̂ =
 23ǫ 1− 13ǫ −1− 13ǫ−1− 13ǫ 23ǫ 1− 13ǫ
1− 13ǫ −1− 13ǫ 23ǫ
 (45)
stands for matrices (38) in the case under consideration.
The eigenvalues h and λ are related to each other via the
expression
λ =
1
3
hgτ1−γ . (46)
In addition, by virtue of (12) the corresponding eigenvec-
tors are to meet the equality∑
x∈X
θxa(h) = 0 (47)
Fig. 3. Instability diagram for the analyzed systems with iden-
tical agents and T →∞.
for every agent a. Using Wolfram Mathematica 7 we have
found the desired collection of the eigenvalues{
−ǫ± i
√
3 , ǫ± i
√
3
}
(48a)
for the two agent system and{
−ǫ± i
√
3 , 2(ǫ± i
√
3)
}
(48b)
for the three agent system, with the first two eigenvalues
being doubly degenerate.
Whence it follows that both the two systems become
unstable when arg(ǫ + i
√
3) < γπ/2, i.e. the inequality
γ >
2
π
arctan
(√
3
ǫ
)
(49)
holds. Figure 3 depicts this condition.
As demonstrated in Appendix B the found condition of
the system instability holds also in the case when the equi-
librium perturbations are caused by random fluctuations
in the reward rates. So the complex system behavior found
in the given deterministic model with dissipation cannot
change drastically under the influence of small perturba-
tions in the reward rates.
3.3 Numerical simulation and the results
3.3.1 Algorithm
Under the assumptions adopted in the previous section
the governing equation (39) can be rewritten in the di-
mensionless form using the replacements
t→ τpt , β qa(x, t)→ qa(x, t) ,
where the characteristic time scale τp of the system dy-
namics is
τp =
τ
(βρτ)1/γ
. (50)
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In these terms it takes the form
CD̂γt0 q2,3 = F̂2,3P2,3 , (51)
where, for example, for the two agent system the vectors
q2 and P2 denote the following collections of variables
q2 = {q1(x1), q1(x2), q1(x3), q2(x1), q2(x2), q2(x3)}
P2 = {P1(x1), P1(x2), P1(x3), P2(x1), P2(x2), P2(x3)}
and the components of these vectors are related as
Pa(x) = e
qa(x)
[
3∑
x′=1
eqa(x
′)
]−1
(52)
by virtue of (11).
The right-hand side of equation (51) is a function of the
vector q2,3 whose derivatives with respect to the compo-
nents of this vector are bounded from above for any value
of q2,3. It enabled us to make use of explicit algorithms
in numerical simulation of the system dynamics (for dis-
cussion of this point see, e.g., [65,77,78,79]). Namely, the
governing equation (51) was solved numerically using the
explicit 2-FLMM algorithm of second order in∆ [79] based
on the following discretization of equation (51)
qn = −
n−1∑
k=1
ω
(γ)
k qn−k + b
(γ)
n q0
+∆γF̂
[(
2− γ
2
)
P(qn−1) +
(γ
2
− 1
)
P(qn−2)
]
. (53)
Here the indices denote the time moments tn = n∆ (n =
2, 3, . . . ) at which the corresponding quantities are taken,
whereas the indices 2 or 3 labeling the systems under con-
sideration are omitted for the sake of simplicity, {ωγk} are
the coefficients entering the Gru¨nwald-Letnikov definition
of fractional derivatives specified, for example, via the fol-
lowing recursive formula
ω
(γ)
0 = 1, ω
(γ)
k =
(
1− 1 + γ
k
)
ω
(γ)
k−1 (54)
for k = 1, 2, . . ., and the coefficient
b(γ)n =
n−1∑
k=0
ω
(γ)
k . (55)
The value q1 at the first step of the iteration was calcu-
lated as
q1 = q0 +∆
γF̂ P(q0) (56)
and the initial value q0 meeting equality (12) was set ran-
domly to initiate system perturbations near the Nash equi-
librium (40).
3.3.2 Instability modes
In the given paper we confine ourselves to discussing var-
ious modes of the system instability found numerically.
Let us, first, present the results of simulation for the two
agent system. Figure 4 depicts two modes A and B of the
long-term dynamics gotten by varying the initial condi-
tions. The shown curves were obtained for the parameter
ǫ = 0.25 and the memory exponent γ = 0.91. On the sta-
bility diagram (Fig. 3) this point lies inside the instability
region just near its boundary; for the given magnitude of
the parameter ǫ the critical value of the memory exponent
is γc ≈ 0.9087.
The mode A is related to a stable limit cycle in the
phase space P1 = {P1(x1), P1(x2), P1(x3)} arising when a
mismatch between the actions of the two agents is remark-
able (Fig. 4, lower row). The mode A was found can arise
in the stability region also, i.e., when γ < γc, in particular,
for γ = 0.905. Figure 3 characterizes the system stabil-
ity only with respect to infinitesimal perturbations rather
then perturbations with finite initial amplitudes. So, these
results demonstrate us that the mode A of the system in-
stability undergoes the subcritical bifurcation as the mem-
ory exponent γ increases. The periodic oscillations found
in the subcritical region, γ < γc, are rather similar in form
to those shown in Fig. 4. Only when the memory exponent
γ goes away from the critical value γc(ǫ) and comes close
to a certain boundary of the absolute stability γs(ǫ) these
oscillations exhibit more complex behavior. In particular,
Fig. 5 (left column) depicts steady state oscillations ob-
tained for γ = 0.905. The corresponding trajectory of the
system motion fills uniformly a certain neighborhood of
the previous limit cycle. So such system motion and can
be regarded as oscillations of the mode A shown in Fig. 4
whose amplitude undergoes some time variations. We have
failed to find steady state oscillations for γ = 0.904 and
ǫ = 0.25; all the perturbations induced by initial random
conditions faded out. It allows us to estimate the bound-
ary of the absolute instability as 0.904 < γs(ǫ) < 0.905 for
the given value of the parameter ǫ. So, when the mode A
of the system instability arises as the memory exponent
γ increases, its attractor seems to become rather complex
in form instantly without a smooth transformation of a
quasicircular line in the phase space P1.
The second mode B is related to the appearance of
oscillatory instability undergoing the supercritical bifur-
cation, i.e. arising only in the instability region γ > γc.
It turns out that even in the close proximity to the in-
stability boundary the simplified model (51) seems not to
be able to describe a possible steady state dynamics of
the type B instability. The found time pattern P1(x1, t)
exhibits the agent preference of taking only one action to
become stronger and stronger as time goes on; the same
does the duration of this choice (Fig. 4, right column).
As also seen in this figure the mode B matches the syn-
chronized behavior of the two agents. It is likely that such
oscillations can be stabilized on temporal scale of order
T by the capacity of the agent memory. In any case this
feature is worthy of individual analysis. Now we can claim
that, at least, the characteristic time scales of oscillations
caused by the instability onset within the modes A and B
differ from each other dramatically.
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Fig. 4. Two modes of the long-term dynamics found for the two agent system. The upper row visualizes the dynamics of the
agent a1 as a ternary phase portrait of its trajectory {P1(x1, t), P1(x2, t), P1(x3, t)} and the middle row shows the corresponding
time pattern P1(x1, t). The agent a1 and the action x1 were chosen to exemplify the typical characteristics of the system
dynamics. The lower row visualizes the correlations in actions of the two agents a1 and a2 in terms of the relationship between
the probability of their choice of the action x1. The present data were obtained for ǫ = 0.25 and γ = 0.91. The critical value of
the memory exponent is equal to γc ≈ 0.9087 for the given magnitude of the parameter ǫ.
As the memory exponent γ goes away from the insta-
bility boundary γc inward the instability region the mode
A becomes dominant, whereas the mode B looses its sta-
bility. It is demonstrated in Fig. 5 (right column) visual-
izing an example of the transient processes of the instabil-
ity development that at the initial stage can be classified
as the mode B and at the final stage converts into the
mode A. Besides, the shown pattern being rather com-
plex in structure enables us to presume that there can be
other modes of the system instability which, at least, are
metastable.
The found two modes A and B can be interpreted as
a self-organization phenomenon of the “selfish” or “altru-
istic” behavior of agents; the term “self-organization” is
used because in the given model the agents act indepen-
dently of one another. Indeed, within the mode A each of
the two agents alternately plays the role of defector taking
mostly the action “beating” the action chosen by the other
agent. It is clearly demonstrated Fig. 4 (lower row panels).
Oppositely, within the mode B the agents cooperate with
each other taking mainly the same action. This behavior is
really altruistic because the reward gained by the defector
exceeds the reward gotten in sharing the same action by
the factor 2/ǫ for the used system parameters. The “al-
truism self-organization” seems to be due to the scale-free
memory because we have failed to find the mode B in
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Fig. 5. The ternary phase portrait of a trajectory {P1(x1, t), P1(x2, t), P1(x3, t)} and the corresponding time pattern P1(x1, t) of
the probability oscillations within the mode A in the subcritical and supercritical regions of the instability onset. The presented
data were obtained for the two agent system with the parameter ǫ = 0.25.
Fig. 6. The ternary phase portrait (in 6000 dots individually) of a trajectory {P1(x1, t), P1(x2, t), P1(x3, t)} and the correspond-
ing time pattern P1(x1, t) visualizing typical features of the instability development for the tree agent system. The presented
data were obtained for ǫ = 0.25 and two values γ = 0.91 and γ = 0.93 of the memory exponent.
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simulating actually the same system where, however, the
agent memory is characterized by a single temporal scale
(Sec. 2.2). Up to now possible mechanisms responsible for
the altruistic behavior are far from being understood well;
a review of the corresponding phenomena and the recently
proposed models can be found in [80,81]. At least, altruism
does not readily evolve as illustrated by evolution of coop-
eration in the prisoner’s dilemma game [82]. In the given
model the altruistic behavior matches the agent choice of
one action for longer and longer time during the learning
process. We note that similar dynamics was found in mod-
eling cyclic variations in cooperator-cheat systems, where
altruism and conspicuous tags of altruists are inherited
via different mechanisms [83].
Figure 6 depicts typical details of the instability devel-
opment for the three agent system. In this case the inter-
action between the agents destroys the mode A and the
system dynamics becomes irregular. However, as seen in
this figure, near the instability boundary γc ≈ 0.9087 for
ǫ = 0.25 the mode B, nevertheless, can survive and emerge
after a sufficiently long transient process during which the
instability development is repeated several times. As a re-
sult the corresponding phase portrait in the form of dots
exhibits some attraction of the system dynamics towards
the origin visualized as a certain origin neighborhood of
dot accumulation. Outside this narrow neighborhood of
the instability boundary the system dynamics becomes
more irregular. The corresponding phase portrait shown
for γ = 0.93 matches a rather uniform dot distribution
over the phase space. The related time pattern, never-
theless, again demonstrates the fact that the system from
time to time returns to the origin and remains in its vicin-
ity during a time interval determined by the instability in-
crement. These results for the three agent system enable
us to claim that the proposed multiagent model of the
reinforcement learning with scale-free memory describes
some anomalous mechanism forcing the system to return
periodically to the origin and reside in its neighborhood
during a remarkable time in spite of the origin being the
unstable point. This mechanism could be a possible ex-
planation for the observed evolutionary stable cyclic varia-
tions in trimorphic populations altered regularly by break-
downs and the formation of dimorphic or monomorphic
populations (see Introduction).
4 Conclusion
A model for multiagent reinforcement learning with scale-
free memory has been constructed. Its development was
partly stimulated by our attempt to elucidate a way of
describing memory effects in systems where living beings
play a crucial role and which can be responsible for long-
term phenomena observed in stock markets, scale-free for-
aging etc. The model details, including the agent non-
transitive interaction of the rock-paper-scissors type, re-
flect characteristic features of trimorphic populations at-
tracted much attention during the last decade in the con-
text of speciation.
The reinforcement learning model assumes that the
agents accumulate their rewards gained from taking some
actions to get awareness about their value and, in addi-
tion, act independently of one another. The interaction
arises implicitly via the reward of one agent depending
on actions of the other agents. The probability of tak-
ing an action is related to the gained awareness via an
exponential function (Boltzmann model). The reward ac-
cumulation is described by an integral operator with a
power-law kernel. In mean field approximation the final
governing equation with fractional time derivative is con-
structed. The scale-free memory poses a question on the
notion of initial conditions for such systems and a certain
approximation allowing it has been found. Its key point is
to relate the initial conditions with the time moment when
the agents start their activity and, thereby, can have only
an awareness inherited in some way. In this case the gov-
erning fractional differential equation is shown to be of the
Caputo type.
The dynamics of systems comprising two and three
identical agents with the rock-paper-scissors interaction is
analyzed in detail. First, the system stability is studied an-
alytically and, then, the instability development is inves-
tigated numerically. In particular, it has been found that
the longer memory, the more easily the Nash equilibrium
looses stability, which is in agreement with the model of
self-organization induced by dynamics of uncertainty [16].
Roughly speaking the agents with weak memory cannot
recognize the presence of other agents and treat their in-
fluence as random fluctuations in the environment.
For the two agent system the numerical analysis of
the instability has demonstrated the existence of two its
modes significantly different in their properties. One mode
matches a limit cycle in the system phase space, stable pe-
riodic oscillations in the probability of agents choice, and
a certain mismatch in the agent behavior. This mode un-
dergoes the subcritical bifurcation and is dominant when
the system parameters lie inside the instability region far
enough from its boundary. The other mode undergoing
the supercritical bifurcation describes oscillations in the
agent preference whose amplitude and period grow contin-
uously in time, at least, within the simplified model used
in numerical simulation. These oscillations could be sta-
bilized by the limit capacity of the agent memory, which
however is worthy of individual investigations. The latter
mode matches the synchronized behavior of the two agents
and can be regarded as “altruism self-organization”. The
studied transient processes enable us to assume that there
should be other modes of the system instability which,
however, seem to be metastable. These phenomena are
due to scale-free memory, at least, for actually the same
model where, however, the memory is described by a sin-
gle scale, only the first instability mode has been found
and it undergoes the supercritical bifurcation.
In the three agent system the interaction of agents de-
stroys the first mode and the system dynamics becomes
irregular. However, near the instability threshold the sec-
ond mode can survive and emerge after rather long and
complex transient processes. For all the initial conditions
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randomly generated in numerical simulation the dynamics
of the three agent system exhibits anomalous attraction
to the equilibrium point, namely, it periodically returns
to the equilibrium point being unstable and resides in its
vicinity during remarkable time intervals. This behavior
resembles the observed dynamics of trimorphic popula-
tions with evolutionary stable cycle variations alternated
by breakdown events giving rise to dimorphic or monomor-
phic populations.
The obtained results enable us also to presume that to
describe the observed complex phenomena in speciation a
relevant model should deal with not only the proportions
of species but also some variables quantifying the process
of species individual learning in adapting to variations in
the environment as well as the population structure.
The authors appreciate the support of RFBR Grants 09-01-
00736 as well as the research support R-24-4 from the Univer-
sity of Aizu.
A Mean field approximation
Let us consider a generalized form of the update rule (5)
Qa(x, tn+1) =W
[
Pa(x, tn)
] · δxxa∆Ra(x|Xa)
− ∆
T
Qa(x, tn) +Qa(x, tn) , (57)
where the weight coefficient W
[
Pa(x, tn)
]
is assumed, at
first, to be a certain smooth function of the choice prob-
ability Pa(x, tn). The system update at the step tn is de-
termined by the collection of expressions (57), where the
agent index a and the action index x run over all their
possible values independently of each other and the Kro-
necker delta δx,xa reflects the choice of the action xa by
the agent a at the time moment tn.
According to the adopted assumption (6) the quanti-
ties {Qa(x, t)} cannot change substantially on scales of or-
der ∆. Therefore we can consider a composite step of the
system update comprising k elementary steps such that
1≪ k≪ T/τ and to write for it the following equation
Qa(x, tn+k) =W
[
Pa(x, tn)
]
∆
∑
xa,Xa∈Cak
δxxa Ra(x|Xa)
− k∆
T
Qa(x, tn) +Qa(x, tn) . (58)
Here the symbol Cak stands for the set of actions
Cak =
a1 a2 . . . aN
1 x11 x12 . . . x1N
2 x21 x22 . . . x2N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
k xk1 xk2 . . . xkN
(59)
where xij is the action taken by the agent aj at the el-
ementary step tn+i of the system update. Each row in
table (59) represents the set xa
⋃Xa of actions at the cor-
responding time from the standpoint of the agent a.
The updated values Qa(x, tn+k) are determined by a
specific realization of the set Cak so, strictly speaking, they
are random quantities. However when the time capacity
T of the agent memory is high enough we can choose
the number of elementary steps sufficiently large that any
agent explore many options of its choice as well as the
choice of the other agents. In this case the sum entering
equation (58) may be replaced by the sum running over
all the possible realizations of the set xa
⋃Xa with the
weights specified by their probabilities
P
(
xa
⋃
Xa|t
)
= Pa(xa, t)
∏
a′∈Ua
Pa′(xa′ , t) . (60)
It should be noted that it is exactly the point where the
adopted assumption about the mutual independence of
the agents in their actions has been taken into account.
The replacement
∑
xa,Xa∈Cak
. . .⇒ k
∑
xa,Xa
P
(
xa
⋃
Xa|t
)
. . . (61)
converts equation (58) into the following
Qa(x, tn+k) = k∆
{
W
[
Pa(x, tn)
]
Pa(x, tn)
×
∑
Xa
Ra(x|Xa)
∏
a′∈Ua
Pa′(xa′ , tn)− 1
T
Qa(x, tn)
}
+Qa(x, tn) (62a)
and treating the quantities {Qa(x, tn)} as continuous func-
tions of time we get
dQa(x, t)
dt
=W
[
Pa(x, t)
]
Pa(x, t)
×
∑
Xa
Ra(x|Xa)
∏
a′∈Ua
Pa′(xa′ , t)− 1
T
Qa(x, t) , (62b)
which is the desired mean field approximation of the up-
date rule (57).
Keeping in mind the reasoning presented in Sec. 2.1
we convert from the quantities Qa(x, t) to the quantities
qa(x, t) showing their relative variations, i.e.,
qa(x, t) = Qa(x, t)− 1
M
∑
x′∈X
Qa(x
′, t) . (63)
In these terms equation (62b) reads
dqa(x, t)
dt
= ra(x, t)− 1
T
qa(x, t) , (64)
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where the relative reward rate is given by the expression
ra(x, t) =W
[
Pa(x, t)
]
Pa(x, t)
×
∑
Xa
Ra(x|Xa)
∏
a′∈Aa
Pa′(xa′ , t)
− 1
M
∑
x′∈X
W
[
Pa(x, t)
]
Pa(x, t)
×
∑
Xa
Ra(x
′|Xa)
∏
a′∈Aa
Pa′(xa′ , t) . (65)
By virtue of relationship (11) and expression (65) the rel-
ative reward rate ra(x, t) is an autonomous function of the
quantities {q1(x, t), q2(x, t), . . . , qN (x, t)}, thereby, the col-
lection of equations (64) forms a closed autonomous model
for the reinforcement learning under consideration.
To complete the derivation of equation (8) we need to
specify the W (P )-dependence.
The W (P )-ansatz
Let us analyze the family of ansa¨tze
W (P ) = P−ν (66)
with a nonnegative exponent, ν ≥ 0, which allows for pos-
sible overweighting of low-probability events. When the
agents do not interfere with one another in their actions
the payoff function Ra(x|X ) = Ra(x) for any agent a does
not depend on the choice of the other agents, thereby, the
relative reward rate ra(x, t) in its list of arguments con-
tains only the quantities qa(x). Let us consider in detail
this situation when the set of possible actions consists of
only two actions, X = {x1, x2}, which, in addition, are
equivalent, i.e., Ra(x1) = Ra(x2) = R. Then using re-
lationship (11) the system of equations (64) for a given
agent a is reduced to the equation
dq
dt
=
R
2
sinh
(
(1 − ν)βq)
[cosh(βq)]1−ν
− q
T
(67)
containing solely the variable q = [Qa(x1)−Qa(x2)]/2.
As it must be, the value q = 0 matching the Nash
equilibrium is a stationary point of equation (67). However
in the limit of large values of the parameter T the Nash
equilibrium can lose the stability if ν < 1. Namely it is
the case when the inequality
(1 − ν)βRT > 2 (68)
holds and equation (67) admits three stationary points,
the point q = 0 being now unstable and two new points
±qs matching the stable dynamics of the given system in
their vicinity. Figure 7 illustrates this situation for ν = 0.
This instability is an innate feature of the given algorithm;
the learning processes does not lead to the hidden Nash
equilibrium q = 0 not due to some external perturbations
induced, for example, by influence of the other agents but
because of the fact that the given agent exploring more
Fig. 7. Illustration of the instability mechanism for reinforce-
ment learning governed by equation (67).
often those options that seem to it more preferable just
faster accumulates their rewords.
To eliminate this mechanism of the Nash equilibrium
instability from the analyzed model we adopt ansatz (66)
with ν = 1. In this case equation (64) with expression (65)
immediately leads us to the governing equation (8) and
express (10).
B Equilibrium perturbations caused by
random fluctuations in the reward rates and
the system stability
In order to analyze the impact of random fluctuations in
the reward rate on the system dynamics we return to the
integral equation (30) and split the term ra(x, t) into two
parts
ra(x, t) = r
r
a(x, t) + r
f
a (x, t) , (69)
where the former one is, as previously, the autonomous
function of the action values, rra
{
qa′(x, t)
}
, specified by
expression (10) and the latter summand represents small
random fluctuations in the reward rate. Dealing with small
perturbations in the system dynamics we may consider
different components of the pattern rfa (x, t) as well as the
variations δqa(x, t) in the action values induced by these
components separately. Therefore, let us confine ourselves
to the case when the random fluctuations rfa (x, t) are lo-
cated inside some internal interval [t1, t2] (here t1 > t0)
and consider time scales such that t− t0 ≫ t2 − t0. Since
no perturbations in qa(x, t) can occur before the time mo-
ment t1 equation (30) for δqa(x, t) and t − t0 ≫ t2 − t0
reads
δqa(x, t) = τ
1−γ
t∫
t0
dt′
Eγ,γ
[
−
(
t−t′
T
)γ]
(t− t′)1−γ δr
r
a(x, t
′)
+
Eγ,γ
[
−
(
t−t0
T
)γ]
(t− t0)1−γ
∫ t2
t1
dt′rf (x, t′) , (70)
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where δrra(x, t) is the regular component of the reward
rate linearized with respect to small variations of qa(x, t)
near the equilibrium point qeqa (x).
Again the known relationship between the Cauchy type
problems for factional differential equations and the Volter-
ra integral equations [64] enables us to state that the
asymptotics of the perturbations δqa(x, t) obeys the fol-
lowing fractional differential equation
D̂γt0δqa(x, t) = τ
1−γδrra(x, t)−
1
T 1−γ
δqa(x, t) , (71)
by virtue of (70). Here the left-hand side is the Riemann-
Liouville fractional derivative of order γ defined by the
expression
D̂γt0qa(x, t) :=
1
Γ (1− γ)
d
dt
t∫
t0
dt′
(t− t′)γ qa(x, t
′) . (72)
The solution δqa(x, t) of equation (71) meets a certain
initial integral condition that, in the frameworks of our
analysis, can be replaced by to the requirement
lim
t→t0
(t− t0)1−γqa(x, t) = C , (73)
where C is some constant [64].
The eigenfunction of the Riemann-Liouville fractional
derivative that meets requirement (73) and possesses the
eigenvalue λ is the so-called γ-exponential function [64]
eλzγ :=
1
(t− t0)1−γEγ,γ [λ(t− t0)
γ ] (74)
with the asymptotic behavior as t→∞
eλtγ =
λ(1−γ)/γ
γ
e(λ
1/γ t) +O
(
1
tγ+1
)
(75a)
for |arg(λ)| ≤ γπ/2 and
eλtγ = −
1
λ2Γ (−γ) · tγ+1 +O
(
1
t2γ+1
)
(75b)
for γπ/2 < |arg(λ)| ≤ π.
The obtained results enable us to state the follow-
ing. First, by virtue of (42) and (75) the instability onset
caused by perturbations in the initial conditions or ran-
dom fluctuations in the reward rate matches the eigen-
values λ of the corresponding fractional derivatives be-
longing to the same region on the complex plane. Second,
equations (31) and (71) governing the dynamics of per-
turbations induced by both of these mechanisms actually
have the same form within the replacement CD̂γt0 ⇔ D̂γt0 .
Thereby the instability condition (49) found in Sec. 3.2 de-
scribes also the instability onset induced by the random
fluctuations in the reward rate.
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